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We investigated whether the differences in perceptual awareness for stimuli at the
threshold of awareness can arise from different global brain states before stimulus onset
indexed by the EEG microstate. We used a metacontrast backward masking paradigm in
which subjects had to discriminate between two weak stimuli and obtained measures of
accuracy and awareness while their EEG was recorded from 256 channels. Comparing
targets that were correctly identified with and without awareness allowed us to contrast
differences in awareness while keeping performance constant for identical physical stimuli.
Two distinct pre-stimulus scalp potential fields (microstate maps) dissociated correct
identification with and without awareness, and their estimated intracranial generators were
stronger in primary visual cortex before correct identification without awareness. This
difference in activity cannot be explained by differences in alpha power or phase which
were less reliably linked with differential pre-stimulus activation of primary visual cortex.
Our results shed a new light on the function of pre-stimulus activity in early visual cortex
in visual awareness and emphasize the importance of trial-by-trials analysis of the spatial
configuration of the scalp potential field identified with multichannel EEG.
Keywords: EEG microstates, perceptual awareness, meta-contrast masking, LAURA inverse solution, alpha phase

INTRODUCTION
Under certain circumstances, sensation and perception can be
dissociated such that the same physical stimulus gives rise to
different perceptual outcomes. Phenomena like multi-stable perception (e.g., the Necker cube and binocularly rivalry) or stimuli
presented at perceptual thresholds share the fact that the same
stimulus can be perceived one way or another or that it can
either be perceived or not. These conditions allow us to study
perceptual awareness independent of sensory processing. Since
such differences in perceptual awareness cannot arise from physical differences in the stimuli, they might arise from differences
in the brain state before the stimulus is encountered (for a recent
review see Britz and Michel, 2011).
Imaging techniques with high temporal resolution, such as
EEG and MEG, provide a means of distinguishing pre-stimulus
activity from post-stimulus activity. The EEG measures the electrical field generated by the brain by using electrodes placed
across the scalp to differentially measure the summation of all
concurrently active intracranial sources at a given time point. The
EEG measurement can be considered as a matrix with space in
one dimension and time in the other dimension. The analyses
of the EEG can focus on the temporal dimension and assess
differences in frequency power or phase at selected electrodes,
or it can focus on the spatial dimension and assess topographic
differences of the electric field. Both characteristics of the EEG
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have been shown to vary before stimulus onset and to influence
how upcoming stimuli can be treated and perceived.
Differences in perceptual awareness of stimuli presented at the
detection and discrimination thresholds could be related to differences in pre-stimulus power and phase in the alpha frequency
band. The alpha band comprises frequencies between 8 and
12 Hz, and its functional significance has been most commonly
described by reflecting cortical excitability to which its power is
inversely related (Pfurtscheller, 1992), with higher levels of alpha
power corresponding to lower levels of excitability, and vice versa.
In line with this notion, it has been shown that the detection of
a light pulse presented at the sensory threshold depends on the
pre-stimulus alpha power: undetected stimuli were preceded by
increased alpha power compared to detected stimuli (Ergenoglu
et al., 2004). Likewise, illusory visual percepts (phosphenes)
induced by a TMS-pulse have been shown to depend on both
inter- (Romei et al., 2008b) and intra-individual (Romei et al.,
2008a) differences in pre-stimulus alpha power. In addition to
detection, discrimination ability in a backward masking task has
been related to both inter- (Hanslmayr et al., 2005) and intra(Hanslmayr et al., 2007; van Dijk et al., 2008) individual differences in pre-stimulus alpha power. Also, the perceptual reversals
of a Necker cube have been shown to be preceded by decreased
alpha power (Isoğlu-Alkaç et al., 1998, 2000; Isoğlu-Alkaç and
Strüber, 2006). Similarly, perceptual reversals during binocular
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rivalry are preceded by decreased gamma power (Doesburg et al.,
2005). In addition, the detection of a near-threshold stimulus
(Busch et al., 2009) and the efficiency of metacontrast masking
(Mathewson et al., 2009) have also been shown to be related to
local differences in the pre-stimulus alpha phase. Taken together,
these results suggest that the ability to detect and discriminate
stimuli presented at the perceptual threshold can vary as a function of the pre-stimulus alpha power and phase, and, hence, on
the excitability of early visual cortex through pulsed inhibition
(Mathewson et al., 2011).
The problem is that amplitude, power and phase modulations
of EEG waveforms are local measures that vary with the reference;
in addition, amplitude and power modulations vary at every
instant, and the phase is different at every electrode (Lehmann
and Michel, 1989), which makes it difficult to interpret the physiological meaning of local differences in power or phase between
conditions. The EEG scalp potential field on the other hand is a
global and reference-free measure of overall brain activity. Different topographies of the potential field directly indicate differences
in the configuration of the underlying sources (Helmholtz, 1853;
Vaughan, 1982). Unlike the constantly changing amplitude and
power modulations, the configuration of the scalp topography
remains stable for brief periods (∼80–120 ms) with sharp transitions between subsequent states. These brief states of stable
topography have been named the “EEG microstates”. Microstates
have been shown to characterize the contents of spontaneous
thoughts (Lehmann et al., 1998, 2010), to explain the trial-totrial differences in the hemispheric lateralization of emotional
word processing (Mohr et al., 2005) and to determine the topography of ERPs (Kondákor et al., 1995; Kondakor et al., 1997).
We have recently shown that microstates can be considered the
electrophysiological correlate of resting-state networks identified
with fMRI which suggests that the momentary scalp configuration
represents the activity in a specific neurocognitive network (Britz
et al., 2010; Van de Ville et al., 2010).
More recently, we have started to investigate the notion that the
global state of the brain indexed by the pre-stimulus microstate
can determine the perceptual awareness of multi-stable stimuli.
These stimuli are physically identical but can have different perceptual interpretations. We could show that the perceptual reversals of ambiguous figures (Britz et al., 2009) and during binocular
rivalry (Britz et al., 2011) arise as a direct consequence of the
pre-stimulus microstate. In both studies, stimuli were presented
intermittently, and we identified two microstate topographies
immediately before stimulus onset that dissociated perceptual
reversals from perceptual stability. Statistical parametric mapping
of their concomitant source differences showed that the reversals
were caused by increased neuronal activity in the right inferior
parietal lobe in both cases.
Microstates have not yet been used to investigate the emergence of perceptual awareness at sensory thresholds. Metacontrast masking is a powerful technique for experimentally
manipulating the visibility of stimuli. A briefly presented target
stimulus is followed by a mask with the same inner cutout of
the same contour as the stimulus. The visibility of the target
varies as a U-shaped function of the interval between stimulus
and mask: at very brief and long inter-stimulus intervals (ISIs),
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the target is visible, but at intermediate ISIs, the mask efficiently
renders the target invisible. Moreover, within those intermediate
ISIs, there appears to be a “sweet spot” at which the masking
effect is efficient in roughly 50% of cases, i.e., the same stimulus
is perceived in about half the trials and not perceived in the other
half of the trials. The efficiency of making is commonly explained
by disruption of re-entrant processing between higher and lower
visual areas after stimulus onset (Fahrenfort et al., 2007, 2008)
and recurrent processing within early visual areas (Boehler et al.,
2008). We assessed a different hypothesis, namely that perceptual
awareness and the efficiency of masking might depend on the
global brain state at the time of stimulus arrival.
In the present study, we used Electrical Neuroimaging (Murray
et al., 2008; Michel et al., 2009) to investigate whether differences
in perceptual awareness can arise from differences in the prestimulus brain state indexed by the EEG microstate immediately before stimulus onset. We used a metacontrast backward
masking paradigm where subjects had to discriminate between
two targets and assessed differences in subjective awareness while
performance was kept constant for physically identical stimuli.
We compared the same physical stimulus when it was correctly
identified with and without awareness, and equating performance
and stimulus properties avoided the confound of awareness with
performance and stimulus properties. Subjective awareness and
objective performance have been shown to be independent, and
awareness is not necessary for correct performance (Schwiedrzik
et al., 2011).
We hypothesized that different pre-stimulus microstates and
thus different neuronal networks in the brain are active when
subjects will become aware of a stimulus in a given trial than
when they do not, and our goal was to identify two states
that dissociate correct stimulus identification with and without
awareness. Statistical parametric mapping of their concomitant
intracranial generator differences will then reveal the location of
activity differences for stimuli that were correctly identified with
and without awareness. In addition to the global measure of prestimulus microstates, we investigated local differences in alpha
power and phase in order to relate our findings to those from
previous studies. Pre-stimulus differences in alpha power have
been independently related to performance and awareness. If prestimulus alpha power over visual cortex is related to visual awareness, we expect to find higher alpha power before stimuli that
were correctly detected with than without awareness. Similarly,
differences in alpha phase over occipital electrodes at stimulus
onset should vary as a function of awareness.

MATERIALS AND METHODS
SUBJECTS

Twenty-three healthy adults (7 male, mean age 23,3 years, range
18–37) were initially screened for the EEG study, and a separate
group of eight adults (3 male, mean age 28.87 years, range 22–
37 years) participated in a behavioral pre-test. All subjects were
right handed as assessed by the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory
(Oldfield, 1971), had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity
as assessed with the Freiburg Visual Acuity Test (Bach, 1996),
the mean decimal Visual Acuity across subjects was 1.698. None
of the subjects reported a history of psychiatric or neurological
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impairments. Subjects participated for monetary compensation
of CHF 20/h after giving informed consent approved by the
Ethics Committee of the University Hospital of Geneva. Eight
participants did not participate in the EEG study because of their
behavioral results in a training period (either too many aware or
too many unaware trials). A total of 15 subjects (4 male, mean age:
23.81 years, range 19–37) completed the EEG experiment. The
data from four subjects was excluded from the analysis because of
primarily unaware responses in one case, primarily correct aware
(CA) responses in another case, and chance performance and an
insufficient number of acceptable trials due to data quality in the
two other cases. Thus, the behavioral and EEG data from a total
of 11 subjects were submitted to further analysis.

520 trials, and subjects performed 8 blocks of 98 trials for a total
of 784 trials.
Since the objective of the current study was to assess differences
in awareness when performance was kept constant for physically
identical stimuli, we compared correctly identified stimuli which
differed in awareness. We therefore first identified the ISI at which
subjects had roughly equal numbers of aware and unaware correct
trials. The paradigm was validated in a behavioral pretest in which
we tested 7 ISIs (13, 26, 39, 52, 65, 78 and 104 ms) with 8 subjects.
This behavioral experiment showed that most subjects had equal
numbers of aware and unaware correct trials at ISIs 39, 52 and
65 ms. We used those ISIs in the subsequent EEG experiment in
addition to an easily visible condition (104 ms) in order to reduce
frustration.

STIMULI AND PROCEDURE

Figure 1 illustrates the stimuli and experimental procedure. Target stimuli were a square and a diamond (the square rotated
by 45◦ ) subtending 1◦ of visual angle. The mask was a larger
contour of the two superimposed targets, which subtended 2◦ of
visual angle, with an inner cutout of the same contour. All stimuli
were presented in white (67.21 cd/m2 ) on a black background
in the center of a CRT screen with a refresh rate of 75 Hz.
Stimulus presentation and timing was achieved using E-prime2
(Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, USA).
Each trial began with the presentation of a fixation cross (1◦ )
at the center of the screen for 500 ms. After a blank interval of
500 ms one of the two possible targets (square or diamond) was
presented for 39 ms. The target was followed by a blank interval
of variable duration (39, 52, 65, 104 ms). Subsequently, the mask
was presented for 52 ms. After the offset of the mask, subjects
first had to indicate which target stimulus they saw, yielding a
measurement of accuracy. They then had to indicate whether
they actually saw the target or whether they guessed the answer,
yielding a measurement of awareness. All responses were made
with the index and middle fingers of the right hand (index finger
for the square and middle finger for the diamond for the first
question and index finger for aware and middle finger for unaware
for the second one). Each session started with a practice run of

EEG RECORDING AND RAW DATA PROCESSING

The EEG was continuously recorded from 256 carbon-fiber
coated Ag/AgCl electrodes using a Hydrocel Geodesic Sensor
Net®. The EEG was digitized at 1 kHz with a band-pass filter of
0–100 Hz and a recording reference at the vertex; impedances
were kept below 30 kΩ. Electrodes located on the cheeks and
in the nape were excluded and 204 electrodes were maintained
for subsequent analysis. Before selecting the relevant epochs, the
EEG was re-referenced to the common average reference and
digitally filtered between 1 and 30 Hz. We used a 2nd order
Butterworth filter with a −12 db/octave roll-off; the filter was
computed linearly with two passes, one forward and one backward in order to eliminate phase shifts and with poles calculated
each time to the desired cut-off frequency. We extracted epochs
of 50 ms before stimulus onset for CA and Correct Unaware
(CU) conditions at each subject’s ideal ISI condition, and trials
contaminated by oculomotor and other artifacts were excluded.
For each participant, channels exhibiting substantial noise were
interpolated using a 3D spherical spline interpolation procedure
(Perrin et al., 1989). On average, 6.3 channels were interpolated
for each subject. The analysis was performed using the Cartool
software by Denis Brunet.1
ANALYSIS OF PRE-STIMULUS MICROSTATES

FIGURE 1 | Experimental procedure. A diamond or square was presented
for 39 ms. After a variable ISI (39, 52, 65, 104 ms), it was followed by a
contour mask. Subjects first had to indicate which stimulus they saw
(accuracy measurement) and then whether they saw the stimulus or
whether they were guessing (awareness measurement).
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As mentioned above, the topography of the scalp electric field
remains quasi-stable for brief periods of ∼80–120 ms, the socalled EEG microstates (Lehmann et al., 1987; Koenig et al., 2002).
During these periods of stability, only the strength, but not the
topography of the field can change. The strength of the scalp field
is reflected in the Global Field Power (GFP), which is computed
as the spatial standard deviation of the potential field (Lehmann
and Skrandies, 1980; Skrandies, 1990). Local maxima of the GFP
are hence the best representative of a given microstate in terms of
signal-to-noise ratio. Previous studies have shown that only the
microstate immediately before stimulus onset is crucial for the
determination of the fate of an upcoming stimulus (Kondákor
et al., 1995; Kondakor et al., 1997; Lehmann et al., 1998; Mohr
et al., 2005; Britz et al., 2009, 2011), which is why we restricted
our analysis to the microstate immediately before stimulus onset.
The microstate analysis comprised five steps:
1 https://sites.google.com/site/fbmlab/cartool
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First, we determined for each subject the ISI at which there
were a similar number of trials in the CA and CU conditions.
Second, we extracted the topographic map at the GFP maximum closest to stimulus onset in the 50 ms time window
before stimulus onset. Because the topography remains stable for
∼100 ms with abrupt transitions between subsequent states, we
reasoned that the GFP peak closest to stimulus onset in the 50 ms
time window before stimulus onset was the best representative of
the pre-stimulus microstate in a given trial. We did this for the CA
and CU conditions for each subject.
Third, we jointly submitted the pre-stimulus microstate maps
from all subjects in the CA and CU conditions to a k-means
spatial cluster analysis (Pascual-Marqui et al., 1995) to identify
the templates of the most dominant microstate maps in the two
conditions. We wanted our analysis to be strictly data-driven and
made no a priori assumptions regarding the number of clusters or
the amount of global explained variance (GEV). We performed a
cluster analysis with 20 different solutions ranging from 1 to 20
clusters and determined the best solution by means of the minimum of the cross-validation criterion (CV). The CV is a measure
of predictive residual variance, i.e., the difference between the
data and the model, and its minimum identifies the solution for
which the residual variance is minimal or—in other words—the
minimum number of clusters that best explain the data.
Fourth, we computed a strength-independent spatial correlation between the template maps representing the optimal solution
of the cluster analysis and the topographic map of the single trials.
We matched, i.e., labeled each single trial pre-state microstate
map with the template map it best corresponded with, thereby
assessing its GEV. The GEV is the sum of the explained variance
weighted by the GFP. It is a measure of how well a map explains
the data both in terms of strength and in terms of frequency of
occurrence. This was done to determine how well the templates
identified by the cluster analysis are represented in the raw data of
each subject.
Fifth, we finally determined which maps dissociated the CA
and the CU conditions by statistically comparing their GEV
between these conditions.
ANALYSIS OF PRE-STIMULUS SOURCE DIFFERENCES

We extracted the single trials labeled by the templates of the maps
that dissociated the CA and CU conditions and estimated the
magnitude of their intracranial generators with a local autoregressive average (LAURA) inverse solution (Grave de Peralta
Menendez et al., 2004). LAURA was computed with a locally
spherical realistic head model (LSMAC; Brunet et al., 2011) using
the ICBM 152 non-linear atlas of the Montreal Neurological
Institute (MNI; Fonov et al., 2011) as the standard brain for all
subjects. The LSMAC model does not require the estimation of a
best fitting sphere. Instead, it uses the realistic head shape and estimates the local thickness of scalp, skull and brain underneath each
electrode. Then, these thicknesses are used in a 3-shell spherical
model with the local radii, which allows taking into consideration
the real geometry between the electrodes and the solution points.
First, the brain surface was extracted from this atlas, and then
the gray matter was extracted from the brain. A total of 4766
solution points was regularly distributed in the gray matter of the
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cerebral cortex and limbic structures. The forward problem was
solved with an analytical solution with a 3-layer conductor model.
This somewhat simplified realistic head model allows an accurate
and rapid analytical solution of the forward problem. It has been
shown to give similar results to boundary element head models
(Guggisberg et al., 2011). Numerous experimental and clinical
studies have shown that this model provides reliable and accurate
estimations of intracranial currents (Brodbeck et al., 2009, 2011;
Groening et al., 2009; Vulliemoz et al., 2009; Plomp et al., 2010).
When considering estimations of intracranial current distributions, one is faced with the problem of thresholding. There cannot
be a predefined threshold that indicates when an estimated source
can be reliably considered as “active”. One way of overcoming this
is by statistically comparing the estimated intracranial currents
between conditions (James et al., 2008, 2011; Britz et al., 2009,
2011; Plomp et al., 2009, 2010; Britz and Michel, 2010). Comparable to statistical parametric mapping used in fMRI research,
we statistically compared the estimated intracranial currents in
the CA and CU conditions at every solution point. We did this
analysis twice: once using only those trials that were labeled as
the microstate maps that dissociated the CA and CU conditions
and once using all trials irrespective of their microstate labeling.
For all analyses reported in the manuscript, we used the False
Discovery Rate (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995) to control for
multiple comparisons.
ANALYSIS OF PRE-STIMULUS POWER AND PHASE

In addition, we analyzed local pre-stimulus differences in alpha
power and phase in order to relate our findings of the microstate
analysis to those of previous studies (Ergenoglu et al., 2004;
Hanslmayr et al., 2005, 2007; Busch et al., 2009; Mathewson et al.,
2009). In order to assess the distribution of phase angles and lags,
we performed the analysis at all 204 electrodes, and in order to
assess the effect of the chosen reference on the distribution of
the phase angles and lags, we repeated the phase analysis using
five different references: the average reference, averaged mastoids,
FPz, Cz and Oz. We applied a discrete Fourier Transform with a
Blackman window to the raw EEG in the 200 ms window before
stimulus onset and extracted the power and phase for every trial
at all electrodes. With a sampling rate of 1000 Hz and a time
window of 200 ms, the frequency resolution of the FFT is 5 Hz.
We compared the power at 10 Hz in the pre-stimulus period
for all trials and those trials classified as the microstate maps
that dissociated the CA and CU conditions. For the analysis of
phase, we first computed the mean phase angle for each subject
in the CA and CU conditions at each electrode. We then assessed
where these phases differed significantly using a Watson-Williams
test (Watson and Williams, 1956) as implemented in the CircStat
Matlab toolbox (Berens, 2009).

RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS

Pilot study

We assessed awareness as a function of accuracy at the 7 ISIs and
the majority of subjects showed equal numbers of trials in the CA
and CU condition at an ISI of 39 ms, the results are plotted in
Figure 2.
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EEG study

Figure 3 summarizes the behavioral results. The majority of
subjects (75%) showed similar numbers of trials in the CA and
CU condition at an ISI of 39 ms, 16.7% of subjects at an ISI of
52 ms and 8.3% at 65 ms. Performance was well above chance
at each of these ISIs (73, 76 and 80%, respectively). On average,
subjects had 40% (SD = 11) of trials in the CA condition and
34% (SD = 9) of trials in the CU condition, this difference was
not significant (t (1,10) = 1.06, p = 0.31). Mean reaction times
were 665 ms (SD = 212 ms) in the CA condition and 819 ms
(SD = 230) in the CU condition. This difference was significant
(t (1,10) = 3.8, p = 0.0036). Although some subjects reported
having seen more squares than diamonds or vice versa, there
was no difference in the identification accuracy for both types
of stimuli (squares: 81% (SD = 11), diamonds: 70% (SD = 22);
t (1,10) = 1.52, p = 0.15). There were no learning effects in the main
EEG experiment: neither accuracy rates (F < 1) nor awareness
(F (1,7) = 1.33, p = 0.249) differed between blocks.
PRE-STIMULUS MICROSTATES

After artifact rejection, on average 152 trials were retained
for every subject. The GFP peak closest to stimulus onset
occurred on average 12.71 ms before the stimulus. The prestimulus microstate maps at the GFP peak closest to stimulus onset of these trials were submitted to a k-means spatial
cluster analysis. The cross validation criterion yielded 16 maps
as the best solution which explained 76.26% of the Global
Variance. We then computed a strength-independent spatial
correlation between the template maps identified in the cluster analysis and those of each trial and statistically assessed

FIGURE 3 | Behavioral results of the EEG experiment. (A) Percentage of
trials for the different conditions—overall accuracy, correct aware, correct
unaware, incorrect aware, and incorrect unaware. Circles denote correct
responses and squares denote incorrect responses. Black lines denote
aware responses and gray lines denote unaware responses, the dotted line
denotes the overall accuracy. Most subjects had equal numbers of correct
aware and correct unaware trials in the 39 ms ISI condition. (B) Reaction
times were faster in the CA than the CU condition. (C) Subjects did not
differ in their ability to correctly identify squares and diamonds.

which template maps best dissociate the CA and CU conditions. Two microstate maps dissociated the CA and the CU
condition with respect to GEV; their templates are displayed
in Figures 4A and 4B, respectively. Map 3 had a significantly
higher GEV in the CU than the CA condition (t (1,10) = −2.67,
p = 0.0234) and Map 16 had a significantly higher GEV in
the CA than the CU condition (t (1,10) = 2.98, p = 0.014). On
average, 15 (+/− 2.8) % of trials were classified as Map 3
or Map16.
PRE-STIMULUS SOURCE DIFFERENCES

FIGURE 2 | Results of the behavioral pilot experiment. Percentage of
trials for the different conditions—overall accuracy, correct aware, correct
unaware, incorrect aware, and incorrect unaware. Circles denote correct
responses and squares denote incorrect responses. Black lines denote
aware responses and gray lines denote unaware responses, the dotted line
denotes the overall accuracy. Most subjects had equal numbers of correct
aware and correct unaware trials in the 39 ms ISI condition.
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We computed distributed LAURA inverse solutions for trials
classified as microstate maps 3 and 16 and assessed their statistical difference at every solution point (Figure 4). We found
statistically significant increased activity in bilateral Cuneus and
Lingual Gyrus in the CU compared to the CA condition (MNI
coordinates of maximal difference: x = −3.03, y = −98.08,
z = −5.7, t = −4.72, p = 0.00082). When considering all trials
of the CU and CA conditions irrespective of their microstate
map classification, we found no differences in current density
anywhere in the brain.
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PRE-STIMULUS POWER AND PHASE DIFFERENCES

We found no pre-stimulus power differences at 10 Hz. This holds
for all trials as well as for trials classified as microstate maps 3
and 16. Figure 5 displays the results of the phase analysis. Panel
5a shows the topographic distribution of the phase angles in the
CA and CU conditions (left and middle panels) and the phase lags
(the difference of the phase angle in the CA and CU conditions) at
all electrodes (right panel). We found significant phase differences
between the CA and CU conditions at 94 out of 204 electrodes.
Nearly opposite phase angles (phase lags of >170◦ ) were found at
only 13 out of 204 electrodes. At five of those electrodes (107, 115,
129, 131, 205), phase lags were >170◦ , and at the other eight (49,
100, 122, 139, 142, 143, 149, 211), the phase lags were < −170◦ .
The topographic distribution of the phase angles in the CA
and CU conditions and the phase lags as well as the location
of significant phase lags depended strongly on the chosen reference (Figure 5c). For an average mastoid reference, we found
significant phase differences >170◦ at five electrodes (149, 152,
157, 193) and significant phase differences < −170◦ at another

FIGURE 4 | Pre-stimulus EEG microstate results. (A) Template of the
microstate map for the Correct Aware (CA) condition (Map 16). (B)
Template of the microstate map for the Correct Unaware (CU) condition
(Map 3). The templates represent normalized voltage maps and are hence
unit-free. (C) Statistical parametric maps (top: t-values, bottom: p-values) of
the LAURA source difference rendered on the ICBM 152 non-linear atlas of
the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI). Blue-violet values indicate
increased current density in the CU condition.

Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience

FIGURE 5 | Pre-stimulus alpha phase results. (A) Topographic distribution
of the phase angles and phase lags for all trials (scaled between –pi and pi)
at all 204 electrodes using an average reference for the CA condition (left
panel), the CU condition (center panel) and the lag between CA and CU
conditions (right panel). (B) Reference dependence of the distribution of
phase angles and phase lags. The left column depicts the distribution of
phase angles in the CA condition, the middle column depicts the
distribution of phase angles in the CU condition and the right column
depicts the distribution of the phase lags between the CA and the CU
conditions. The first row depicts the results for an average mastoid
reference, the second row for an FPz reference, the third row for a Cz
reference and the fourth row for an Oz reference.

five (118, 147, 156, 158, 210) occipital electrodes. For an FPz and
a Cz reference, there were no significant phase differences, and
with an Oz reference, we found significant differences >170◦ at
18 electrodes (1, 50, 51, 53, 56, 57, 68, 70, 106, 116, 123, 124, 142,
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156, 163, 205, 214, 223) and significant differences < −170◦ at 12
electrodes (74, 85, 105, 113, 173, 181, 204, 210, 211, 212, 221, 222)
at frontal, central and occipital sites.

DISCUSSION
We show that differences in visual awareness of physically
identical stimuli can be related to differences in pre-stimulus
microstates and their concomitant neuronal generators. We used a
metacontrast masking paradigm in which subjects had to discriminate between a square and a diamond target followed by a mask
and compared physically identical stimuli that were correctly
identified with and without awareness. We identified two global
brain states indexed by the pre-stimulus microstate on a trialby-trial basis that dissociated the CA and the CU conditions.
Statistical parametric mapping of their concomitant intracranial
generators revealed increased current density in the Cuneus and
Lingual Gyrus before the onset of stimuli that were identified
without awareness. These anatomically defined areas are part of
the primary visual cortex. Because different topographies necessarily imply different generators (Helmholtz, 1853; Vaughan,
1982), these results indicate that primary visual cortex is more
strongly pre-activated when subjects fail to become aware of a
stimulus presented at the threshold of awareness.
This finding might initially sound counterintuitive, since one
might assume that “more activity” directly implies “better performance” or “increased awareness”, which is likely the case for above
threshold stimuli but not necessarily for near-threshold stimuli.
Our interpretation of this finding is that the pre-activation of
visual cortex apparently interferes with adequate processing of
weak stimuli. The effects of masking are commonly explained
by disruption of re-entrant processing between higher and lower
visual areas (Fahrenfort et al., 2007, 2008) and recurrent processing within early visual areas (Boehler et al., 2008) by the
mask after the stimulus is encountered. We hypothesized that
the pre-stimulus brain-state can also influence the efficiency
of masking and could identify two pre-stimulus brain states
indexing differential activity in early visual cortex that dissociate
efficient from inefficient masking. Our results can complement
the prevailing view of the mechanisms underlying masking: the
pre-stimulus activity in early visual cortex can be considered as
an alternative source of interference with re-entrant processing.
An alternative explanation is that if the primary visual cortex is
already active before the onset of a weak stimulus at the threshold
of awareness, such a weak stimulus cannot provide sufficient
additional activity to attain awareness. In other words, the brain
appears to be unable to distinguish between the spontaneous
pre-activation of primary visual cortex and the post-stimulus
activity evoked by a weak near-threshold stimulus. This finding
is supported by a recent study by He (2013) where she elegantly
shows how behaviorally relevant negative interactions between
pre- and post-stimulus activity can be observed on a trial-bytrial basis in the absence of mere amplitude differences between
conditions. This inverse relation between pre- and post-stimulus
activity sheds a new light on the functional relation between
spontaneous and evoked activity. In another modality, trial-totrial differences in output force have been found to be inversely
related to levels of pre-stimulus activity in primary motor cortex
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(Fox et al., 2007). These results underline the importance of recent
methodological advances that consider trial-to-trial variations in
ongoing activity instead of averaged differences between conditions which reveal important new insights into brain function.
Traditionally, trial-to-trial variations in behavioral and neuronal
measures are dismissed as noise and eliminated by signal averaging, however, it is becoming increasingly evident that these
variations are functionally significant activity with an important
impact on perception and cognition (Mohr et al., 2005; Fox
et al., 2007; Britz et al., 2009, 2011; Britz and Michel, 2010,
2011; Garrett et al., 2011, 2013; Kanai and Rees, 2011; Tzovara
et al., 2012, 2013; He, 2013). Our current results further support
the significance of such apparently slight trial-to-trial variations;
even though we considered only a subset of trials, we identified
that proportion which yielded consistent differences across all
single trials from all subjects. We of course can not rule out
that activity differences in other brain areas—most probably in
parietal and frontal areas—might have also contributed to the
differences in the emergence of perceptual awareness. However,
the contributions of other brain areas are less strong and less
consistent than those in early visual cortex immediately before
stimulus onset.
In order to compare our results to previous studies, we assessed
pre-stimulus alpha power and phase which are considered to
index different aspects of cortical excitability. Alpha power is
considered as an index of alertness and general excitability of
visual cortex to which it is inversely related (Pfurtscheller, 1992).
Alpha phase on the other hand is assumed to reflect cyclic
variations in cortical excitability (Busch et al., 2009; Mathewson
et al., 2009; Scheeringa et al., 2011). Several EEG and MEG
studies have shown increased pre-stimulus alpha power for undetected compared to detected stimuli (Ergenoglu et al., 2004;
Hanslmayr et al., 2007; Romei et al., 2008a,b, 2010). Likewise, the ability to correctly distinguish between two stimuli
presented at the discrimination threshold depends on the prestimulus alpha power (Hanslmayr et al., 2005; van Dijk et al.,
2008). Simultaneous EEG-fMRI studies however provide mixed
results about the relation between alpha power and activity in
primary visual cortex indexed by the BOLD response (Becker
et al., 2011; Scheeringa et al., 2011). In the present study, we
found no pre-stimulus differences in alpha power at 10 Hz.
This is surprising given that other studies have shown that both
awareness and discrimination ability can vary as a function of
pre-stimulus alpha power. In those studies, performance was
close to chance, i.e., subjects were able to detect or to correctly
discriminate stimuli in roughly 50% of cases and in such cases
alpha power appears to be a powerful tool to distinguish between
differences in detection or discrimination ability. Here, we analyzed differences in awareness for correctly identified stimuli,
and performance was very high (subjects responded correctly
in about 80% of trials). When performance is close to ceiling,
alpha power no longer appears to be a good parameter to
distinguish between correct discrimination with and without
awareness. Instead, we could relate the differences in awareness
for correct target discrimination to a global pre-stimulus brain
state that reflects differential pre-stimulus activity in primary
visual cortex.
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Other studies have related awareness to local differences in
phase of the alpha and theta band (Busch et al., 2009; Mathewson
et al., 2009; Dugué et al., 2011). These differences in awareness
as a function of the pre-stimulus alpha phase, i.e., that a stimulus
was perceived when it occurs during a certain phase and that it
was not perceived during the opposite phase, were interpreted
as cyclic variations of cortical excitability or inhibition. However,
this claim is difficult to support because local variations in phase
are reference dependent, which renders the functional interpretation of a peak or trough very challenging. We analyzed the
pre-stimulus alpha phase at all 204 electrodes using five different
references. We found significant phase inversions between the CA
and CU conditions, but both their location and their direction
varied strongly with the chosen reference. Not a single electrode
out of the 204 showed consistent phase inversions across the five
references we used, which renders the functional interpretation of
the location of phase differences on the one hand and that of peaks
and troughs at best arbitrary. We thus replicate the results from
previous studies that show differences in awareness as a function
of pre-stimulus alpha phase, but we also show that such local
phase differences have to be interpreted with a lot of caution.
The link between visual cortex excitability and alpha phase
has been claimed without a direct demonstration; differences in
excitability are generally inferred from the fact that a stimulus is
perceived or not. Here, we show that this link between local phase,
awareness and pre-stimulus activity in primary visual cortex is not
as direct as previously claimed. We show that the global brain state
immediately before stimulus onset can be more unambiguously
linked to pre-stimulus differences in primary visual cortex activity
than local differences in alpha phase, and the present results
corroborate the importance of the state of visual cortex at the time
of stimulus arrival for visual awareness.
The present results extend the results from our prior studies
in which we showed that the changes in the perceptual awareness for ambiguous stimuli and during binocular rivalry arise
as a direct consequence of pre-stimulus microstates (Britz et al.,
2009; Britz and Michel, 2011). These studies revealed that the
right inferior parietal cortex is implicated in the generation of
perceptual reversals of multi-stable stimuli and that inferior temporal areas are involved in percept stabilization during binocular
rivalry. Here, we show that the emergence of perceptual awareness for correctly identified stimuli presented at the threshold of
awareness can likewise be linked to the pre-stimulus microstate
which indexes that primary visual cortex is differentially active
immediately before stimulus onset.
Activity in primary visual cortex is necessary but not sufficient
to attain awareness (Tong, 2003), and there is ample evidence that the dynamic interplay of activity in lower visual
and higher order brain areas in parietal and frontal cortex are crucial for awareness (Lumer et al., 1998; Dehaene
et al., 2006; Lamme, 2006; Lau and Passingham, 2006). Using
fMRI, Lau and Passingham (2006) have shown that prefrontal cortex comes into play when subjects become aware
of stimuli that are equated for performance but not physical
identity, thus confounding awareness and stimulus properties.
Because of the slow temporal dynamics of the hemodynamic
response function, the precise temporal allocation of fMRI
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effects remains a challenge. Several EEG studies however indicate that parietal and prefrontal areas might come into play
only after stimulus onset (Sergent et al., 2005; Fahrenfort et al.,
2007, 2008; Genetti et al., 2010) when subjects become aware
of stimuli.
In the present study, we bridged the gaps between awareness,
accuracy and physical identity by assessing awareness when accuracy was kept constant for physically identical stimuli. For every
subject, we compared physically identical stimuli that were correctly identified but that differed in awareness. To our knowledge,
this is the first study that has attempted to equate both physical identity and behavioral accuracy when assessing differences
in awareness. The apparent differences between awareness and
accuracy during experimental manipulations of stimulus visibility have been recently challenged as being due to conservative
response criteria for the awareness ratings and by being abolished
by using the bias-free measurement of d’ (Ko and Lau, 2012; Lloyd
et al., 2013). It should be noted though, that the inclusion of nonstimulus trials necessary for the computation of d’ themselves
might introduce more conservative response criteria because subjects have to distinguish between stimuli with different degrees
of visibility and the physical absence of stimuli. Furthermore,
the order of identity and awareness judgments might likewise
influence the awareness ratings. In the present study, subjects
knew that there was always a stimulus present and that they had
to indicate whether or not they saw it after they indicated its
identity which should not have strongly biased their awareness
judgment. However, future studies are needed to address these
issues in more detail.
Taken together, the same physical stimuli can undergo very different perceptual fates as a function of the state of the brain before
stimulus arrival: differences in frequency power or phase on the
one hand, and differences in the overall configuration of intracranial generators indexed by the scalp topography on the other
hand yield different perceptual outcomes of the same stimulus.
These findings are important to consider when comparing ERPs
to differences in perceptual awareness: differences in topography,
power or phase between single trials in the “baseline” period can
be easily eliminated and translated into a post-stimulus effect by
performing a baseline correction.
Previous studies have claimed that differences in awareness
result from differences in pre-stimulus alpha power or opposite
pre-stimulus alpha phase, which supposedly reflect cyclic variations in the excitability of primary visual cortex. However, a
direct demonstration between alpha power, alpha phase, visual
awareness, and activity in primary visual cortex has been lacking.
In the present study, we show that differences in awareness for the
same stimuli arise from differences in a global pre-stimulus brain
state that reflects differential pre-stimulus activity in primary
visual cortex.
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Isoğlu-Alkaç, U., and Strüber, D. (2006). Necker cube reversals during long-term
EEG recordings: sub-bands of alpha activity. Int. J. Psychophysiol. 59, 179–189.
doi: 10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2005.05.002
James, C. E., Britz, J., Vuilleumier, P., Hauert, C.-A., and Michel, C. M. (2008).
Early neuronal responses in right limbic structures mediate harmony incongruity processing in musical experts. Neuroimage 42, 1597–1608. doi: 10.1016/j.
neuroimage.2008.06.025
James, C. E., Michel, C. M., Britz, J., Vuilleumier, P., and Hauert, C.-A. (2011).
Rhythm evokes action: early processing of metric deviances in expressive music
by experts and laymen revealed by ERP source imaging. Hum. Brain Mapp. 33,
2751–2767. doi: 10.1002/hbm.21397
Kanai, R., and Rees, G. (2011). The structural basis of inter-individual differences
in human behaviour and cognition. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 12, 231–242. doi: 10.
1038/nrn3000

www.frontiersin.org

May 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 163 | 9

Britz et al.

Micro-state dependent awareness

Ko, Y., and Lau, H. (2012). A detection theoretic explanation of blindsight suggests
a link between conscious perception and metacognition. Philos. Trans. R. Soc.
Lond. B Biol. Sci. 367, 1401–1411. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2011.0380
Koenig, T., Prichep, L., Lehmann, D., Sosa, P. V., Braeker, E., Kleinlogel, H., et al.
(2002). Millisecond by millisecond, year by year: normative EEG microstates
and developmental stages. Neuroimage 16, 41–48. doi: 10.1006/nimg.2002.1070
Kondakor, I., Lehmann, D., Michel, C. M., Brandeis, D., Kochi, K., and Koenig,
T. (1997). Prestimulus EEG microstates influence visual event-related potential
microstates in field maps with 47 channels. J. Neural. Transm. 104, 161–173.
doi: 10.1007/bf01273178
Kondákor, I., Pascual-Marqui, R. D., Michel, C. M., and Lehmann, D. (1995).
Event-related potential map differences depend on the prestimulus microstates.
J. Med. Eng. Technol. 19, 66–69. doi: 10.3109/03091909509030277
Lamme, V. A. F. (2006). Towards a true neural stance on consciousness. Trends
Cogn. Sci. 10, 494–501. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2006.09.001
Lau, H. C., and Passingham, R. E. (2006). Relative blindsight in normal observers
and the neural correlate of visual consciousness. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U S A 103,
18763–18768. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0607716103
Lehmann, D., and Michel, C. M. (1989). Intracerebral dipole sources of EEG FFT
power maps. Brain Topogr. 2, 155–164. doi: 10.1007/BF01128852
Lehmann, D., Ozaki, H., and Pal, I. (1987). EEG alpha map series: brain microstates by space-oriented adaptive segmentation. Electroencephalogr. Clin. Neurophysiol. 67, 271–288. doi: 10.1016/0013-4694(87)90025-3
Lehmann, D., Pascual-Marqui, R. D., Strik, W. K., and Koenig, T. (2010). Core
networks for visual-concrete and abstract thought content: a brain electric
microstate analysis. Neuroimage 49, 1073–1079. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.
2009.07.054
Lehmann, D., and Skrandies, W. (1980). Reference-free identification of components of checkerboard-evoked multichannel potential fields. Electroencephalogr.
Clin. Neurophysiol. 48, 609–621. doi: 10.1016/0013-4694(80)90419-8
Lehmann, D., Strik, W. K., Henggeler, B., Koenig, T., and Koukkou, M. (1998).
Brain electric microstates and momentary conscious mind states as building
blocks of spontaneous thinking: I. visual imagery and abstract thoughts. Int.
J. Psychophysiol. 29, 1–11. doi: 10.1016/s0167-8760(97)00098-6
Lloyd, D. A., Abrahamyan, A., and Harris, J. A. (2013). Brain-stimulation induced
blindsight: unconscious vision or response bias? PLoS One 8:e82828. doi: 10.
1371/journal.pone.0082828
Lumer, E. D., Friston, K. J., and Rees, G. (1998). Neural correlates of perceptual
rivalry in the human brain. Science 280, 1930–1934. doi: 10.1126/science.280.
5371.1930
Mathewson, K. E., Gratton, G., Fabiani, M., Beck, D. M., and Ro, T. (2009). To see
or not to see: prestimulus alpha phase predicts visual awareness. J. Neurosci. 29,
2725–2732. doi: 10.1523/jneurosci.3963-08.2009
Mathewson, K. E., Lleras, A., Beck, D. M., Fabiani, M., Ro, T., and Gratton, G.
(2011). Pulsed out of awareness: EEG alpha oscillations represent a pulsed inhibition of ongoing cortical processing. Front. Psychol. 2:99. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.
2011.00099
Michel, C. M., Koenig, T., Brandeis, D., Gianotti, L., and Wackermann, J. (2009).
Electrical Neuroimaging. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mohr, C., Michel, C. M., Lantz, G., Ortigue, S., Viaud-Delmon, I., and Landis, T.
(2005). Brain state-dependent functional hemispheric specialization in men but
not in women. Cereb. Cortex 15, 1451–1458. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhi025
Murray, M. M., Brunet, D., and Michel, C. M. (2008). Topographic ERP analyses:
a step-by-step tutorial review. Brain Topogr. 20, 249–264. doi: 10.1007/s10548008-0054-5
Oldfield, R. C. (1971). The assessment and analysis of handedness: the Edinburgh
inventory. Neuropsychologia 9, 97–113. doi: 10.1016/0028-3932(71)90067-4
Pascual-Marqui, R. D., Michel, C. M., and Lehmann, D. (1995). Segmentation of
brain electrical activity into microstates: model estimation and validation. IEEE
Trans. Biomed. Eng. 42, 658–665. doi: 10.1109/10.391164
Perrin, F., Pernier, J., Bertrand, O., and Echallier, J. F. (1989). Spherical splines for
scalp potential and current density mapping. Electroencephalogr. Clin. Neurophysiol. 72, 184–187. doi: 10.1016/0013-4694(89)90180-6
Pfurtscheller, G. (1992). Event-related synchronization (ERS): an electrophysiological correlate of cortical areas at rest. Electroencephalogr. Clin. Neurophysiol. 83,
62–69. doi: 10.1016/0013-4694(92)90133-3
Plomp, G., Mercier, M. R., Otto, T. U., Blanke, O., and Herzog, M. H. (2009).
Non-retinotopic feature integration decreases response-locked brain activity as

Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience

revealed by electrical neuroimaging. Neuroimage 48, 405–414. doi: 10.1016/j.
neuroimage.2009.06.031
Plomp, G., Michel, C. M., and Herzog, M. H. (2010). Electrical source dynamics
in three functional localizer paradigms. Neuroimage 53, 257–267. doi: 10.1016/j.
neuroimage.2010.06.037
Romei, V., Brodbeck, V., Michel, C., Amedi, A., Pascual-Leone, A., and Thut, G.
(2008a). Spontaneous fluctuations in posterior alpha-band EEG activity reflect
variability in excitability of human visual areas. Cereb. Cortex 18, 2010–2018.
doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhm229
Romei, V., Gross, J., and Thut, G. (2010). On the role of prestimulus alpha rhythms
over occipito-parietal areas in visual input regulation: correlation or causation?
J. Neurosci. 30, 8692–8697. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0160-10.2010
Romei, V., Rihs, T., Brodbeck, V., and Thut, G. (2008b). Resting electroencephalogram alpha-power over posterior sites indexes baseline visual cortex excitability.
Neuroreport 19, 203–208. doi: 10.1097/WNR.0b013e3282f454c4
Scheeringa, R., Mazaheri, A., Bojak, I., Norris, D. G., and Kleinschmidt, A.
(2011). Modulation of visually evoked cortical fMRI responses by phase
of ongoing occipital alpha oscillations. J. Neurosci. 31, 3813–3820. doi: 10.
1523/JNEUROSCI.4697-10.2011
Schwiedrzik, C. M., Singer, W., and Melloni, L. (2011). Subjective and objective
learning effects dissociate in space and in time. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U S A 108,
4506–4511. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1009147108
Sergent, C., Baillet, S., and Dehaene, S. (2005). Timing of the brain events underlying access to consciousness during the attentional blink. Nat. Neurosci. 8, 1391–
1400. doi: 10.1038/nn1549
Skrandies, W. (1990). Global field power and topographic similarity. Brain Topogr.
3, 137–141. doi: 10.1007/bf01128870
Tong, F. (2003). Primary visual cortex and visual awareness. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 4,
219–229. doi: 10.1038/nrn1055
Tzovara, A., Murray, M. M., Michel, C. M., and De Lucia, M. (2012). A tutorial
review of electrical neuroimaging from group-average to single-trial eventrelated potentials. Dev. Neuropsychol. 37, 518–544. doi: 10.1080/87565641.2011.
636851
Tzovara, A., Rossetti, A. O., Spierer, L., Grivel, J., Murray, M. M., Oddo,
M., et al. (2013). Progression of auditory discrimination based on neural
decoding predicts awakening from coma. Brain 136, 81–89. doi: 10.1093/
brain/aws264
Van de Ville, D., Britz, J., and Michel, C. M. (2010). EEG microstate sequences in
healthy humans at rest reveal scale-free dynamics. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U S A
107, 18179–18184. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1007841107
van Dijk, H., Schoffelen, J.-M., Oostenveld, R., and Jensen, O. (2008). Prestimulus
oscillatory activity in the alpha band predicts visual discrimination ability. J.
Neurosci. 28, 1816–1823. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1853-07.2008
Vaughan, H. G. J. (1982). The neural origins of human event-related potentials.
Ann. N Y Acad. Sci. 388, 125–138. doi: 10.1111/j.1749-6632.1982.tb50788.x
Vulliemoz, S., Thornton, R., Rodionov, R., Carmichael, D. W., Guye, M., Lhatoo, S.,
et al. (2009). The spatio-temporal mapping of epileptic networks: combination
of EEG-fMRI and EEG source imaging. Neuroimage 46, 834–843. doi: 10.1016/j.
neuroimage.2009.01.070
Watson, G. S., and Williams, E. J. (1956). On the construction of significance tests
on the circle and the sphere. Biometrika 43, 344–352. doi: 10.2307/2332913
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was conducted
in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed
as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 06 March 2014; paper pending published: 31 March 2014; accepted: 17 April
2014; published online: 14 May 2014.
Citation: Britz J, Díaz Hernàndez L, Ro T and Michel CM (2014) EEG-microstate
dependent emergence of perceptual awareness. Front. Behav. Neurosci. 8:163.
doi: 10.3389/fnbeh.2014.00163
This article was submitted to the journal Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience.
Copyright © 2014 Britz, Díaz Hernàndez, Ro and Michel. This is an open-access
article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC
BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this
journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution
or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

www.frontiersin.org

May 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 163 | 10

